If an attacker captures a ticket (i.e., by intercepting the CH) that is not an issue.
The ticket is encrypted with the server's STEK, so an attacker cannot decrypt it. This prevents the attacker from recovering the server's state and impersonating either the server or the client. Recall that the client and server immediately send finished messages using the secrets from the previous session, which the attacker does not have (even when replaying a captured ticket)
One security guarantee disappears, though: Forward Secrecy
An attacker that gains access to the potentially long-lived STEK of the server can decrypt all session tickets encrypted under that STEK. Hence, STEK rotation is highly recommended!
If you are interested in Session Ticket Security, you can check out Sven's paper on it:
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity23-hebrok.pdf
Best,
Niklas